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A series of three experimentswas designed to test predictions from amotivational systems
approach to understanding the role of clinical constructs in anxiety-based problems.
Negative mood, inﬂated responsibility, and intolerance of uncertainty (IU) were separately
manipulated within analog samples to examine their effect on the other two factors.
In the ﬁrst experiment (n = 59) the negative mood group scored signiﬁcantly higher in
terms of inﬂated responsibility than the positive mood group. In the second experiment
(n = 63) the high responsibility group scored signiﬁcantly higher in terms of both negative
mood and IU than the low responsibility group. In the third experiment (n = 61) the high
IU group scored signiﬁcantly higher in terms of negative mood than the low IU group.
Tests of indirect effects revealed an indirect effect of IU on inﬂated responsibility through
negative mood and an indirect effect of negative mood on IU through inﬂated responsibility,
suggesting all three constructs are causally interrelated. The ﬁndings are consistent with
contemporary transdiagnostic views of clinical constructs, and support a view of anxiety
that is underpinned by a coordinated and interdependent motivational system evolved to
manage threat.
Keywords: anxiety disorders, depression, inflated responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, negative mood
INTRODUCTION
In contrast to fear, which is an emotion evolved to deal with imme-
diate threats, anxiety is an emotion that has evolved to deal with
anticipated threats and challenges (Barlow, 2002). While anxiety
has been researched extensively in the clinical psychology and psy-
chopathology literature it has received very little attention in the
emotion literature (Tracy and Randles, 2011). This lack of atten-
tion has meant that the study of anxiety as a normal functionally
adaptive emotion has been relatively neglected when compared
with research on clinical anxiety. A theoretical consequence of this
is that models of clinical anxiety have had no signiﬁcant models
of normal anxiety to draw on and have therefore tended to reﬂect
models constructed solely around understanding and explaining
clinical anxiety itself (Davey, 2006).
How might contemporary cognitive models of clinical anxi-
ety be reconciled with anxiety as an emotion evolved to deal with
anticipated threats? Some authors argue anxiety is best viewed
as part of an evolved integrated threat management system (e.g.,
Schaller et al., 2007; Neuberg et al., 2011). Experienced emotions
such as anxiety are features of any “precautionary system” that
simultaneously alerts the individual to challenges and threats to
goals, and coordinates cognitive and behavioral reactions in order
that the individual can respondmore effectively to these challenges
and threats. Threat management systems will evolve separately
to deal with speciﬁc and different challenges to reproductive ﬁt-
ness, but individual systems will be characterized by a functional
coherence in which perceptual, affective, cognitive, and behavioral
processes work together to reduce the ﬁtness costs of poten-
tial threats (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Keltner et al., 2006). As perceptual,
affective, cognitive, and behavioral elements are all part of an inte-
grated evolved functional system, we would expect these elements
to be highly coordinated and interdependent, with the affective
experience being an emerging property of the activation of the
various functional elements in the system (Kenrick and Shiota,
2008; Neuberg et al., 2011).
Can contemporary approaches to understanding clinical
anxiety be reconciled with overarching motivational systems
approaches (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2010) and what value might
motivational systems approaches add to the understanding of
clinical anxiety? If clinical anxiety is fundamentally derived from
anxiety as an adaptive emotion thenone implicationof themotiva-
tional systems view of clinical anxiety is that emotional, cognitive
and behavioral elements characteristic of anxiety disorders should
be coordinated and interdependent within the threatmanagement
system relevant to anxiety. The existence of an integrated system
underlying anxiety experience should be revealed by experimen-
tal studies identifying a network of causal interactions between
anxiety-related emotional experience and anxiety-relevant cogni-
tive and behavioral processes. Interactions between the emotional,
cognitive, and behavioral elements thatmake up a system forman-
aging anticipated threats are especially likely to be observed in
individuals who chronically perceive themselves to be vulnerable
to future threats (e.g., high anxious individuals) or who are made
anxious during experimental manipulations (cf. Neuberg et al.,
2011).
At this point, however, it is important to understand how clin-
ical psychology researchers have developed their own theoretical
approaches to understanding clinically experienced anxiety and
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how these might be integrated into a functional systems view of
anxiety. While the external symptoms of clinical anxiety are well
documented and deﬁned (e.g., American Psychiatric Association,
2000) the cognitive features associatedwith such anxiety haveoften
been explored and described with the use of clinical constructs
that attempt to capture the beliefs, attitudes, and thought patterns
associated with clinical anxiety and with speciﬁc anxiety disorders
(Davey, 2003). Within a motivational systems approach it would
be expected that the cognitive factors captured by these clinical
constructs should represent processes developed to help the indi-
vidual detect and deal with anticipated threat. Given individuals
with anxiety disorders are hypervigilant for threat and especially
prepared to react to and deal with anticipated threat, the cognitive
constructs developed to explain clinical anxiety are likely to reﬂect
exaggerated examples of the elements that make up any threat
management system1.
The present paper describes the results of three experi-
ments designed to investigate whether anxiety-related clinical
constructs and their affective experience may be representative
of a more integrated system underlying anxious responding.
We achieved this by taking two example anxiety-relevant con-
structs, in this case inﬂated responsibility and intolerance of
uncertainty (IU), and one psychopathology relevant mood state,
negative mood, and examined the effect of manipulating each
one of these factors on measures of the other two. Inﬂated
responsibility is deﬁned as the belief that one has the power to
bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes
(Salkovskis, 1985; Rachman, 1998), and IU is deﬁned as a
“dispositional characteristic that arises from a set of negative
beliefs about uncertainty and its connotations and consequences”
(Birrell et al., 2011, p. 1200) and is underpinned by appraisals
such as “uncertainty is dangerous,” “uncertainty is intolerable,”
and “I can’t deal with uncertainty” (Koerner and Dugas, 2006).
Inﬂated responsibility and IU have been extensively researched
over the years, and have been highly inﬂuential in the develop-
ment of theories of psychopathology – especially anxiety-based
psychopathology.
Considering anxiety as an integrated threat management sys-
tem within a motivational systems approach is particularly timely
because of recent developments in transdiagnostic research con-
ducted on anxiety-relevant clinical constructs. For example,
Carleton (2012) has provided compelling evidence that IU is
a transdiagnostic construct that is signiﬁcantly related to mea-
sures of a number of anxiety disorders, including generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD),
panic disorder, and social anxiety (Dugas et al., 2005b; Car-
leton et al., 2007b, 2010; Lind and Boschen, 2009). Furthermore,
there is evidence of IU extending beyond anxiety to mediating
other mood-related disorders such as depression (McEvoy and
Mahoney, 2012). Inﬂated responsibility is also a construct with
transdiagnostic features, having been implicated in the devel-
opment and maintenance of OCD, GAD, and depressed mood
1A growing body of research conﬁrms that many anxiety disorders (e.g., generalized
anxiety disorder and obsessive–compulsive disorder) have dimensional rather than
categorical properties, indicating a quantitative continuum of processes across non-
clinical populations into clinical populations (e.g., Haslam, 2003; Haslam et al.,
2005; Olatunji et al., 2008).
(Aardema et al., 1997; Rachman, 1998; Startup and Davey, 2003).
While these studies indicate that clinically developed constructs
have a much broader application across anxiety and mood disor-
ders than was previously suspected, there is little or no research
to date on how these constructs interrelate. If these constructs
interrelate through an evolutionarily determined threat manage-
ment system, then we would expect them to be highly coordinated
and interdependent, and to inﬂuence the experience of nega-
tive mood (e.g., anxiety or depression) in experimental studies
designed to independently manipulate each variable. Speciﬁcally,
if constructs, emotion states and symptoms are all components
of a functionally integrated threat management system evolved
to deal with anticipated threats, then we would predict that
(1) manipulation of individual constructs would either directly
or indirectly increase self-reported experience of the relevant
emotion (i.e., negative mood2), that (2) manipulation of neg-
ative mood would increase scores either directly or indirectly
on construct measures, and (3) manipulation of each con-
struct would increase scores either directly or indirectly on the
other.
EXPERIMENT 1
The ﬁrst experiment is designed to assess the effect of an exper-
imental mood manipulation on self-report measures of inﬂated
responsibility and IU. Participants were randomly assigned to
either a positive or negativemoodmanipulation group and under-
went appropriate music-based mood manipulation procedures
before being asked to complete a short questionnaire consist-
ing of items relating to the constructs inﬂated responsibility and
IU. Because speciﬁc discrete mood manipulations are difﬁcult to
achieve in practice (Gross and Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg et al.,
2007; Meeten and Davey, 2012) we adopted a polar, non-speciﬁc
valenced mood manipulation using mood manipulations that
have previously been used in studies investigating the role of mood
in anxious psychopathology (e.g., MacDonald and Davey, 2005).
Negativemood encompassing both feelings of anxiety and sadness
(depression) is a common feature of OCD (Roper and Rachman,
1976; Salkovskis, 1985; Frost et al., 1986) and GAD (Metzger et al.,
1990; Meyer et al., 1990; Davey et al., 1992). If cognitive constructs
such as inﬂated responsibility and IU represent cognitive compo-
nents of an integrated threat management system then we would
predict that negativemood should be accompanied, either directly
or indirectly, by facilitated scores on measures of inﬂated respon-
sibility and IU. If the constructs of inﬂated responsibility and IU
represent unidirectional causes of negative mood and anxiety-
related symptoms, however, we would not predict an effect of
negative mood on measures of these constructs.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 59 psychology undergraduates from the Univer-
sity of Sussex (men: 7; women: 52). Age ranged from 18 to 43 years
2We have chosen to manipulate and measure negative mood generally in these
studies because (1) speciﬁc negative moods such as anxiety are difﬁcult to induce
in a discrete fashion (Meeten and Davey, 2012), and (2) the constructs selected for
investigation in this study are implicated across both anxiety and depression (e.g.,
Carleton et al., 2012a).
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(M = 21.03, SD = 5.61). All of the participants were volunteers
who received partial fulﬁllment of a course requirement by tak-
ing part in the experiment. There were no signiﬁcant differences
between the two groups in terms of age, t(57) = 0.97, p = 0.33,
or the distribution of male participants, χ2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.72,
suggesting randomization between groups was successful.
Ethical approval for experiment 1 was provided by the ethics
committee at The University of Sussex.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups,
depending on the valence of the mood manipulation they were
to receive, these groups were labeled positive (n = 30) and nega-
tive (n = 29). Randomization was achieved by the experimenter
drawing lots prior to the participant’s arrival. All participants were
tested individually in a small room containing a PC with head-
phones and an angle-poise lamp. Therewas a retractable blindover
the only window in the roomwhich could be open or closed (clos-
ing of the blind almost completely stopped day light from entering
the room). Participants completed a consent formwhich stated the
experiment was about music comprehension and memory and
how this is related to personality. The consent form informed par-
ticipants that they would be asked to listen to some music and
then, after a ten minute break, they would be asked to ﬁll in some
questionnaires.
Stage 1: mood manipulation. Participants wore headphones so
they could listen to a short piece of music. The music lasted
approximately 8 min. The experimenter left the room while the
music was playing and returned after 8 min. Participants in the
negative mood group listened to a piece of music which had pre-
viously been shown to induce a negative mood state (MacDonald
and Davey, 2005): Gyorgy Ligeti, Lux Aeterna. Blinds were drawn
over the windows and the main room lights were switched off,
only the angle-poise lamp was used to illuminate the room. Par-
ticipants in the positive mood group listened to a different piece
of music: Delibes, Mazurka from Coppelia (only the section from
1 min 46 s to 3 min 10 s, looped). The blinds in the room were left
open allowing full day light into the room, the main lights were
turned on as was the angle-poise lamp.
Stage 2: 10 min break and short questionnaire. The experimenter
re-entered the room immediately after the music had ﬁnished
and reminded the participant about the impending 10 min break
before asking the participant if they would mind ﬁlling in a ques-
tionnaire unrelated to the experiment during the break. The
experimenter told the participant the questionnaire was related
to a separate questionnaire study being conducted by the exper-
imenter’s supervisor and that the questionnaire would take just
over 5 min to complete. All participants agreed to ﬁll in the
questionnaire. The experimenter left the room for 10 min while
the participant ﬁlled in the questionnaire. The data collected in
this questionnaire was actually to be used in the analysis of the
present study. The reason for deceiving participants about this
questionnaire was to reduce any experimental demand effects
and to minimize any perceived link between the music as a
mood manipulation procedure and subsequent data collection.
The short questionnaire contained a separate consent form which
stated the questionnaire study was broadly concerned with deci-
sionmaking. Moodwasmeasured in the questionnaire using three
questions where participants were asked to rate their current level
of sadness, happiness and anxiety on separate 100 point visual ana-
log scales (VAS) (where 0 = not at all sad/happy/anxious and 100
extremely/sad/happy/anxious). Responsibility was measured using
three example items taken from the Responsibility Attitude Scale
(RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000). The itemswere“If I think bad things,
this is as bad as DOING bad things,”“I will be condemned for my
actions,” and “Other people should not rely on my judgment.”
Participants rate how much they agree with each statement at the
present moment in time on separate 100 point VAS. The three
items had acceptable internal consistency (α= 0.78). These items
were chosen as they seemed to capture in a small number of items
many of the key characteristics of inﬂated responsibility (see, e.g.,
Salkovskis et al., 1996). IU was measured using three items taken
from the IU scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994). Participants rate to
what extent they agree with the items at this exact moment in
time on three separate 100 point VAS (where 0 = Totally Disagree
and 100 = Totally Agree). The items were “Uncertainty stops me
having a ﬁrm opinion,”“It’s unfair there are no guarantees in life,”
and “Being uncertain means I am not ﬁrst rate.” The three items
had acceptable internal consistency (α = 0.80). These items were
chosen as they seemed to capture in a small number of itemsmany
of the key characteristics of IU (see, e.g., Freeston et al., 1994).
Stage 3: full questionnaires and debrief. The experimenter
re-entered the room after the 10 min “break” had ﬁnished and
gave the participant another questionnaire booklet. The partici-
pant was asked to inform the experimenter when they had ﬁnished
the questionnaire booklet. The questionnaire booklet contained a
number of questionnaires. The ﬁrst questionnaire was a “music
comprehension and memory” questionnaire designed speciﬁcally
for the purposes of this experiment and was not used in the data
analysis of this experiment. As part of the questionnaire booklet
participants completed the full versionof theRAS (Salkovskis et al.,
2000) and the full version of the IUS (Freeston et al., 1994). After
completing the questionnaire booklet, participants were thanked
and debriefed, and any participant who had undergone a negative
mood manipulation was offered a positive mood manipulation
before they left.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Within this paper, two groups were consider to differ on a given
construct only if the VAS measure of that construct (if more than
one question was used, then a composite of these VAS measures)
reached the level of p< 0.05 (two-tailed) and if theVASmeasure of
the construct correlated signiﬁcantly with the full trait measure of
the construct (note that only full trait measures of IU and inﬂated
responsibility were measured in the three experiments reported in
this paper, no“trait”measures of mood were used and so onlyVAS
measures were considered in relation to mood). In all three exper-
iments reported in this paper the reliability of the full measure
of inﬂated responsibility: the RAS, and IU: the IUS, were excel-
lent (lowest alphas for both measures α = 0.91, respectively, in
Experiment 3). In addition, in all three experiments reported in
this paper theVASmeasures of inﬂated responsibility and IU were
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highly signiﬁcantly positively correlated with their respective full
traitmeasure (RASor IUS) in each experiment (all correlations sig-
niﬁcant at p< 0.001). Finally, across all three experiments, where a
signiﬁcant differencewas found between the two respective groups
on the VAS measures of inﬂated responsibility or IU, a signiﬁcant
difference between the respective groups was also found on the
full trait measure of that construct (RAS or IUS). Where a signif-
icant difference was not found between the two respective groups
on the VAS measures of inﬂated responsibility or IU, signiﬁcant
differences between the respective groups were also not found on
the full trait measures of that construct (RAS or IUS). Given the
consistency of these results, and in an effort to be succinct, reliabil-
ity data for the RAS and IUS, correlations between VAS measures
and the RAS and IUS and group differences on the RAS and IUS
are not reported in any of the experiments that follow. It is worth
noting, however, that the fact all signiﬁcant differences between
groups on VAS measures of inﬂated responsibility and IU were
mirrored with signiﬁcant differences on the full trait measures of
those constructs (RAS and IUS) provides a good deal of conﬁdence
in the validity of these ﬁndings, given that these full measures of
constructs are trait measures which are thought to be difﬁcult to
inﬂuence by experimental manipulation.
It should be noted that a short-form version of the IUS exists
which it has been argued better approximates IU as a construct
independent from worry than the original IUS (Carleton et al.,
2007a). The short-form IUS consists of 12 items which are iden-
tical to 12 items found in the original IUS. Given the argument
that the short-form IUS better approximates IU as a construct
independent from worry, all analyses across all three experiments
which involved the original IUS were rerun. In these analyses only
the 12 items found in the IUS short-form were included. The
results of these analyses were identical in terms of signiﬁcant/non-
signiﬁcant distinctions to those reported above for the original
IUS.
RESULTS
Mood manipulation check
Each mood measure was subjected to an independent measures
sample t-test. For the three mood measures, the assumption of
homogeneity of variances was violated, and so adjusted p-values
are reported. The negative mood group (M = 30.65, SD= 22.23)
scored signiﬁcantly higher on the sadness measure than the pos-
itive mood group (M = 09.57, SD = 08.07), t(35.03) = 4.81,
p < 0.001, d = 1.080. The positive mood group (M = 73.90,
SD = 10.33) scored signiﬁcantly higher on the happiness mea-
sure than the negative mood group (M = 56.79, SD = 19.46),
t(42.36) = 4.20, p < 0.001, d = 1.144. The negative mood group
(M = 37.53, SD= 26.48) scored signiﬁcantly higher on the anxiety
measure than the positive mood group (M = 18.20, SD = 17.28)
t(47.96) = 3.32, p < 0.01, d = 0.834. These data suggest that
participants in the negative mood group were signiﬁcantly more
anxious and sad, and less happy than participants in the positive
mood group.
Responsibility measures
A composite responsibility score was created by combining the
means of the three questions used in the short questionnaire. The
negativemood group (M= 35.83, SD= 19.47) scored signiﬁcantly
higher on this composite responsibility measure than the positive
mood group (M = 25.72, SD = 17.97), t(57) = 2.07, p < 0.05,
d = 0.612.
IU measures
A composite IU score was created by combining the means of the
three questionsmeasuring IU used in the short questionnaire. The
negative mood group (M = 41.35, SD = 19.21) scored higher
on this composite IU measure than the positive mood group
(M = 32.28, SD = 19.23) but this difference was not signiﬁcant,
t(57)= 1.81, p = 0.08, d = 0.479.
SUMMARY
The ﬁndings from Experiment 1 indicate that participants under-
going a negative mood manipulation scored signiﬁcantly higher
in terms of inﬂated responsibility than participants undergoing
a positive mood manipulation. The mood manipulation had no
statistically signiﬁcant direct effect on IU (however, see the section
on meditational analyses and tests of indirect effects for evidence
of a signiﬁcant indirect effect of negative mood on IU).
EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment is designed to assess the effect of an
experimental inﬂated responsibility manipulation on self-report
measures of negative mood and IU. This novel procedure uses a
vignette-based responsibilitymanipulation prior to estimating the
manipulations effect on mood and IU.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 63 psychology undergraduates from the Univer-
sity of Sussex (men: 6; women: 57). Age ranged from 18 to 56 years
(M = 22.06, SD = 7.45). All of the participants were volunteers
who received partial fulﬁllment of a course requirement by tak-
ing part in the experiment. There were no signiﬁcant differences
between the two groups in terms of age, t(61) = 0.71, p = 0.48,
or the distribution of male participants, χ2(1) = 0.67, p = 0.41,
suggesting randomization between groups was successful.
Ethical approval for Experiment 2 was provided by the ethics
committee at The University of Sussex.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups,
depending on themanipulation they were to receive. These groups
were labeled high responsibility (n = 31) and low responsibility
(n= 32). Randomization was achieved by the experimenter draw-
ing lots prior to the participant’s arrival. All participants were
tested individually in a small room that simply contained a chair
and a desk. Participants completed an informed consent form
which stated participants would be asked to read a “true story”
and that they would be asked some questions about the story. The
consent form informed participants there would then be a ten-
minute break and that they would then be asked to ﬁll in some
questionnaires.
Stage 1: responsibility manipulation. Participants read one of two
stories, dependent on the group to which they had been assigned.
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Both pieces were written from an autobiographical perspective by
a character called Clara, a 25 year old woman. Although partic-
ipants were told they were reading a true story the stories were
in fact ﬁctitious and were created for the experiment. Both stories
were printed onA4 paper andwere of a similar length (about three
and a half sides of A4). In the story given to the high responsibility
groupClara is a personwho lacks any sense of responsibility. Clara
describes her lack of responsibility and gives descriptions of inci-
dences that she was partly or wholly responsible for but over which
she had failed to take any responsibility. Clara describes how her
failure to take responsibility for these incidences (and others) had
led to negative consequences for her. Throughout the story Clara
expresses regret about her lack of responsibility and toward the
end of the story states that she wants to become amore responsible
person but that she feels she needs some help in doing this. Par-
ticipants in the high responsibility group are asked to write down
advice to help Clara feel, and act, like a more responsible person.
“Example advice,” consisting of ﬁve statements, is given after the
story to give participants some idea of the sort of advice they may
want to offer. In the story given to the low responsibility group
Clara is a person who has an inﬂated sense of responsibility. Clara
describes her inﬂated sense of responsibility and gives descrip-
tions of incidences which have occurred which she had little or no
control over but over which she felt immense responsibility. Clara
describes how her inﬂated sense of responsibility has had nega-
tive consequences for her. Throughout the story Clara displays
an awareness regarding the negative affect her inﬂated sense of
responsibility is having on her life and toward the end of the story
states that she wants to become a person who feels less responsible
but that she feels she needs some help in doing this. Participants
in the low responsibility group are asked to write down advice to
help Clara feel less responsible. “Example advice,” consisting of
ﬁve statements, is given after the story to give participants some
idea of the sort of advice they may want to offer.
To ensure the responsibility manipulation complied with def-
initions of the inﬂated responsibility construct (e.g., Salkovskis
et al., 1996) four speciﬁc features of inﬂated responsibility were
deﬁned and explicitly referred to in the advice vignettes given to
participants. These features were: (1) a sense of feeling overly
responsible in the most literal sense (i.e., feeling bad for harm
caused, taking on responsibility for things that are not necessarily
the individual’s fault), (2) the idea that thinking about something
(e.g., causing harm) is as bad as doing something, (3) the idea
that not preventing harm is as bad as causing harm, (4) worry-
ing about causing harm before anything has actually happened
(e.g., hypervigilance). In the story given to the low responsibil-
ity group Clara displays all of these deﬁned features while the
“example advice” offered to Clara is aimed at advising her about
how to minimize or eliminate these feelings from her life. In the
story given to the high responsibility group Clara is described as
not displaying any of these deﬁned features and displays a range
of opposing feelings. The “example advice” offered to Clara is
aimed at advising her about how she can, and should, bring these
feelings into her life. After reading their respective vignettes, par-
ticipants in both groups were asked to write their advice on A4
paper. The experimenter left the room while the participant read
the story and wrote down their advice. No set time limit was given
to complete this task. The responsibility manipulation is based on
Bem’s self-perception theory that proposes that an individual will
infer his or her attitude based on information derived from his
or her behavior (Bem, 1972). Salancik and Conway (1975) pro-
posed that the individual will infer his or her attitude through a
process of generating and assessing relevant information from the
past and present, and that the individual will be especially likely
to use information made most conspicuous to them at the time.
When an individual describes an attitude or behavior positively or
negatively, therefore, he or she will generate cognitions consistent
with their endorsement.
Stage 2: 10 min break and short questionnaire.As in stage 2 of
Experiment 1, participants were asked to ﬁll in a short question-
naire participants were told was related to a separate questionnaire
study. The questionnaire contained the VAS measures of the three
constructs.Mood, sadness, and anxietyweremeasured in the ques-
tionnaire using the same questions used in Experiment 1 but an
additional question was added, participants were now also asked
to rate their current level of negativity on a 100 point VAS (where
0 = not at all negative and 100 = extremely negative). The three
items measuring negative mood had good internal consistency
(α = 0.86). IU was measured using ﬁve items taken from the
IUS (Freeston et al., 1994). Participants rate to what extent they
agreed with the items at that exact moment in time on ﬁve sepa-
rate 100 point VAS (where 0 = Totally Disagree and 100 = Totally
Agree). The ﬁve items were, “Uncertainty stops me from having a
strong opinion,”“Uncertaintymakes life intolerable,”“I can’t stand
being taken by surprise,”“I can’t stand being undecided about my
future,” and “Being uncertain means that I am not ﬁrst rate,” The
ﬁve items had moderate internal consistency (α = 0.69). These
items were chosen as they seemed to capture in a small number
of items many of the key characteristics of IU (see, e.g., Free-
ston et al., 1994). Responsibility was measured using four items
each taken from the RAS (Salkovskis et al., 2000) where partici-
pants rate how much they agree with each statement on separate
100 point VAS. These items were “I often take responsibility for
things that other people do not think are my fault,” “Even if
my actions are unlikely to bring about negative consequences for
others, I should always try to prevent them from occurring,” “If
I think bad things, this is as bad as DOING bad things,” and
“To me, not acting to prevent disaster is as bad as making dis-
asters happen.” These four items were used because they each
separately related to the four deﬁned inﬂated responsibility char-
acteristics portrayed in the experimental vignettes and seemed to
capture in a small number of items many of the key character-
istics of inﬂated responsibility (see, e.g., Salkovskis et al., 1996).
The four items appeared to have moderate internal consistency
(α= 0.66).
Stage 3: full questionnaires and debrief. The experimenter
re-entered the room after the 10min“break”had ﬁnished and then
gave the participant another questionnaire booklet and asked the
participant to inform the experimenter when they had ﬁnished the
questionnaire booklet. The experimenter then left the room until
the participant had ﬁnished the questionnaire booklet. This ques-
tionnaire booklet contained the full version of the RAS (Salkovskis
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et al., 2000) and the full IUS (Freeston et al., 1994). After com-
pleting the questionnaire booklet, participants were thanked and
debriefed.
RESULTS
Responsibility manipulation check
A composite responsibility score was created by combining the
means of the four questions measuring responsibility used in the
short questionnaire. The high responsibility group (M = 54.11,
SD= 13.55) scored signiﬁcantly higher on the composite measure
of responsibility than the low responsibility group (M = 33.95,
SD= 17.76), t(61)= 5.13, p < 0.001, d = 1.314.
Mood measures
The high responsibility group (M = 34.45, SD = 21.46) scored
signiﬁcantly higher on the sadness measure than the low responsi-
bility group (M = 14.75, SD= 13.01), t(49.15)= 4.39, p< 0.001,
d= 1.252 (as the assumption of homogeneity of varianceswas vio-
lated the adjusted p-value is reported for this ﬁnding). The high
responsibility group (M = 39.35, SD= 25.52) scored signiﬁcantly
higher on the anxiety measure than the low responsibility group
(M = 26.94, SD = 21.08), t(61) = 2.11, p < 0.05, d = 0.540.
The high responsibility group (M = 35.48, SD = 24.73) scored
signiﬁcantly higher on the negativitymeasure than the low respon-
sibility group (M = 15.43, SD= 14.80), t(48.75)= 3.89, p< 0.001,
d= 1.114 (as the assumption of homogeneity of varianceswas vio-
lated the adjusted p-value is reported for this ﬁnding). The high
responsibility group (M = 36.43, SD= 21.11) scored signiﬁcantly
higher on the composite measure of negative mood than the low
responsibility group (M = 19.04, SD = 13.52), t(50.81) = 3.88,
p < 0.001, d = 1.089 (as the assumption of homogeneity of
variances was violated the adjusted p-value is reported for this
ﬁnding).
In summary, these data suggest that the high responsibility
group were signiﬁcantly more anxious, sadder, and more negative
(both onVAS and compositemeasures) than the low responsibility
group. In order to assess whether the two differing vignettes may
have directly affectedmoodby containing differential levels of neg-
ative material, eight independent participants (men: 2; women: 6;
age: M = 24.38, SD= 3.89) were asked to read each vignette (only
the story part without the subsequent advice examples) and to
report on a 100-point VAS scale how the vignette made them feel
(where 0 = extremely positive, 50 = neither positive or negative,
and 100 = extremely negative). A repeated measures t-test indi-
cated that those reading the low responsibility vignette reported
signiﬁcantly more negativity (M = 62.75, SD = 8.21) than those
reading the high responsibility vignette (M = 53.38, SD = 5.63),
t(7) = 2.61, p < 0.05, d = 1.331. Given that the low responsibil-
ity manipulation appears to contain more negative material than
the high responsibility manipulation it appears highly unlikely the
high responsibility group experienced signiﬁcantly greater nega-
tive mood than the low responsibility group due to differences in
the respective vignettes’ content.
IU measures
A composite IU score was created by combining the means of
the ﬁve questions measuring IU used in the short questionnaire.
The high responsibility group (M = 41.55, SD = 16.88) scored
signiﬁcantly higher on this composite IU measure than the low
responsibility group (M = 32.11, SD = 15.11), t(61) = 2.34,
p < 0.05, d = 0.599.
SUMMARY
Experiment 2 conﬁrmed that manipulating inﬂated responsi-
bility using a vignette-based responsibility manipulation had a
consistent effect on self-reported mood. Speciﬁcally, the high
responsibility group generated signiﬁcantly higher self-reported
ratings of anxiety, sadness, negativity, and general negative mood
(as measured by the composite negative mood measure) than
the low responsibility group. Subsequent ratings of the vignettes
themselves by independent raters revealed that this differential
effect on mood could not be accounted for by any inherent differ-
ences in negative content between the high and low responsibility
vignettes, suggesting that mood differences were caused by the
responsibility-related cognitions generated by the advice partici-
pants provided after reading the vignettes. The high responsibility
group also reported signiﬁcantly higher levels of IU than the low
responsibility group.
EXPERIMENT 3
The third experiment is designed to assess the effect of an experi-
mental IUmanipulation on self-reportmeasures of negativemood
and inﬂated responsibility. This novel procedure, which is sim-
ilar to the responsibility manipulation used in Experiment 2,
uses a vignette-based IU manipulation prior to estimating the
manipulations effect on inﬂated responsibility and negativemood.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 61 undergraduates from theUniversity of Sussex
(men: 16; women: 45). Age ranged from 18 to 33 years (M = 20.26,
SD = 2.82). All of the participants were volunteers who received
partial fulﬁllment of a course requirement or received a small
monetary fee for taking part in the experiment. There were no
signiﬁcant differences between the two groups in terms of age,
t(59) = 0.91, p = 0.36, or the distribution of male participants,
χ2(1)= 2.80, p= 0.11, suggesting randomization between groups
was successful.
Ethical approval for Experiment 3 was provided by the ethics
committee at The University of Sussex.
Procedure
Stage 1: IU manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of two groups, the high IU group (n = 30) and the low
IU group (n = 31). Randomization was achieved by the experi-
menter drawing lots prior to the participant’s arrival. Participants
read one of two stories, dependent on the group to which they
had been assigned. Both pieces were written from an autobio-
graphical perspective by a character called Kayla, a 25 year old
woman. Although participants were told they were reading a true
story the stories were in fact ﬁctitious and were created for the
experiment. Both stories were printed on A4 paper and were of a
similar length (about two sides of A4). In the story given to the
high IU group Kayla is a person who has very little or no reaction
to uncertainty. In the story Kayla discusses her inability to react
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to uncertainty and gives descriptions of uncertain situations she
has had little or no reaction too. Kayla describes how her failure
to respond to the uncertainty surrounding these situations (and
others) has led to negative consequences for herself and others.
Throughout the story Kayla expresses regret about her inability to
react to uncertainty and toward the end of the story states that she
wants to become someone who reacts when faced with uncertain
situations as this may prevent her from making risky decisions,
but states that she needs some help in doing this. Participants in
the high IU group are asked to write down advice to help Kayla
react better to uncertainty. “Example advice,” consisting of ﬁve
statements, is given after the story to give participants some idea
of the sort of advice they may want to offer. In the story given to
the low IU group Kayla is a person who ﬁnds uncertainty very dif-
ﬁcult to cope with as it causes her a lot of stress and anxiety. In the
story Kayla describes how uncertain situations worry her and gives
descriptions of uncertain situations which have paralyzed her and
prevented her from reacting. Kayla describes how her failure to
act in these situations (and others) due to her fear of uncertainty
has led to negative consequences for herself and others. Through-
out the story Kayla displays an awareness regarding the negative
affect her anxiety surrounding uncertainty is having on her life
and toward the end of the story states that she wants to become a
person who is able to relax when faced with an uncertain situation
and that she does not want to be paralyzed by uncertainty, but that
she feels she needs some help in doing this. Participants in the low
IU group are asked to write down advice to help Kayla become less
anxious and paralyzed by uncertainty. “Example advice,” consist-
ing of ﬁve statements, is given after the story to give participants
some idea of the sort of advice they may want to offer.
To ensure that the IU manipulation complied with deﬁnitions
of the IU construct, ﬁve speciﬁc features of IU were deﬁned and
explicitly referred to in the advice vignettes given to participants.
These features were: (1) uncertainty leads to the inability to act,
(2) uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, (3) unexpected events
are negative and should be avoided, (4) being uncertain is unfair,
(5) being uncertain reﬂects badly on a person (see Freeston et al.,
1994). In the story given to the low IU group Kayla displays all of
these beliefs about uncertainty while the “example advice” offered
to Kayla is aimed at advising her about how to minimize or elim-
inate these kinds of beliefs about uncertainty. In the story given
to the high IU group Kayla does not display any of these beliefs
about uncertainty and in fact displays a range of opposing beliefs.
The “example advice” offered to Kayla is aimed at advising her
about how she can, and should, bring these kinds of beliefs about
uncertainty into her life. After reading their respective vignettes,
participants in both groups were asked to write their advice on A4
paper. The experimenter left the room while the participant read
the story and wrote down their advice. No set time limit was given
to complete this task.
Stage 2: 10 min break and short questionnaire.As in stage 2
of Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to ﬁll in a short
questionnaire participants were toldwas related to a separate ques-
tionnaire study. The questionnaire contained theVASmeasures of
the three constructs. IU was measured in the short questionnaire
using the same ﬁve questions as were used in experiment two. The
ﬁve items had acceptable internal consistency (α = 0.75). Mood
was measured in the questionnaire using the same three questions
as Experiment 2. The three items measuring negative mood had
mediocre internal consistency (α= 0.66). Responsibility wasmea-
sured in the short questionnaire using the same four questions as
were used in experiment two. These four items also had mediocre
internal consistency (α= 0.63).
Stage 3: full questionnaires and debrief. The experimenter re-
entered the room after the 10 min “break” had ﬁnished and gave
the participant another questionnaire booklet, asking the par-
ticipant to inform the experimenter when they had ﬁnished the
questionnaire booklet. The experimenter then left the room until
the participant had ﬁnished the questionnaire booklet. This ques-
tionnaire booklet contained the full version of the RAS (Salkovskis
et al., 2000) and the IUS (Freeston et al., 1994). After complet-
ing the questionnaire booklet, participants were thanked and
debriefed.
RESULTS
IU manipulation check
A composite IU score was created by combining the means of the
ﬁve questions measuring IU used in the short questionnaire. The
high IU group (M = 33.93, SD= 14.55) scored signiﬁcantly higher
on this composite IU measure than the low IU group (M = 16.89,
SD= 11.49), t(59)= 5.10, p < 0.001, d = 1.300.
Mood measures
The high IU group (M = 23.80, SD= 19.30) scored higher on the
sadness measure than the low IU group (M = 19.39, SD= 15.99),
but this difference was not signiﬁcant, t(59) = 0.97, p = 0.35,
d = 0.249. The high IU group (M = 36.63, SD = 24.90) scored
signiﬁcantly higher on the anxiety measure than the low IU group
(M = 23.13, SD = 22.63), t(59) = 2.22, p < 0.05, d = 0.567. The
high IU group (M = 34.20, SD= 21.64) scored higher on the neg-
ativity measure than the low IU group, (M = 24.36, SD = 21.01),
but this difference was not signiﬁcant, t(59) = 1.80, p = 0.08,
d = 0.461. A composite negative mood score was created by com-
bining the means of the three questions measuring negative mood
used in the short questionnaire. The high IU group (M = 31.54,
SD= 15.82) scored signiﬁcantly higher on this compositemeasure
of negativemood than the low IU group (M = 22.29, SD= 16.27),
t(59)= 2.25, p < 0.05, d = 0.576.
In summary, the high IU group scored signiﬁcantly higher
in terms of anxiety and general negative mood (as measured by
the negative mood composite measure) than the low IU group.
In order to assess whether the two differing vignettes may have
directly affected mood by containing differential levels of negative
material, nine independent participants (men: 1; women: 8; age:
M = 23.46, SD= 3.49) were asked to read each vignette (only the
story part without the subsequent advice examples) and to report
on a 100-point VAS scale how the vignette made them feel (where
0 = extremely positive, 50 = neither positive or negative, and
100 = extremely negative). A repeated measures t-test indicated
that those reading the low IU vignette reported more negativity
(M = 61.89, SD= 13.74) than those reading the high IU vignette
(M = 54.44, SD = 17.61) but this difference was not signiﬁcant,
t(8)= 1.01, p = 0.34, d = 0.471.
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Responsibility measures
A composite responsibility score was created by combining the
means of the four questions measuring responsibility used in the
short questionnaire. The high IU (M = 38.05, SD= 16.57) group
scored higher on this composite responsibility measure than the
low IU group (M = 32.35, SD = 17.77), but this difference was
not signiﬁcant, t(59)= 1.30, p = 0.20, d = 0.332.
SUMMARY
In summary, the high IU group scored signiﬁcantly higher than
the low IU group in terms of anxiety and composite negativemood
but not inﬂated responsibility (however, see the section on med-
itational analyses and tests of indirect effects for evidence of a
signiﬁcant indirect effect of IU on inﬂated responsibility).
MEDIATION ANALYSIS AND TESTS OF INDIRECT EFFECTS
The model of the direct signiﬁcant relationships between negative
mood, inﬂated responsibility and IU to emerge from Experiments
1–3 is graphically presented in Figure 1. If the manipulation of a
given construct in an experiment led to a signiﬁcant direct effect
on another construct then this is indicated in Figure 1 by a causal
line joining the two constructs together. Mediation analysis and
tests of indirect effects were performed for two purposes: (A) to
examine if any direct relationship between variable x and variable
y was partially or fully mediated by variable m (as suggested by
the model in Figure 1) and (B) to see if variable x might have an
indirect effect on variable y through variable m (as suggested by
the model in Figure 1).
In all the analyses which follow the x variable used in each
analysis is the grouping variable used to separate the high and
low group on the given x construct in the relevant experiment in
which construct x was manipulated. The m and y variables used
in each analysis were the composite VAS score for the respective
m and y constructs in the relevant experiment in which construct
x was manipulated. Analyses were performed using the statistical
package AMOs 21. Bootstrapping (1000 samples) was used to
evaluate the signiﬁcance of the indirect pathways.
FIGURE 1 | Significant direct relationships between the three
constructs to emerge from Experiments 1–3. Standardized beta values
and their signiﬁcance (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01) are reported. Note that
signiﬁcant indirect effects are not shown.
MEDIATION ANALYSIS
Examination of Figure 1 suggests that the causal relationship
between inﬂated responsibility (x) and negative mood (y) may
be partially or fully mediated by IU (m). Before the effect of the
mediator was taken into account, inﬂated responsibility signiﬁ-
cantly predicted negative mood (β = 0.45, p < 0.001). Although
the relationship between inﬂated responsibility andnegativemood
was partiallymediated by IU this relationship remained signiﬁcant
when the mediator was taken into account (β = 0.36, p < 0.01).
The path therefore is kept in the model.
TESTS OF INDIRECT EFFECTS
Examination of Figure 1 also suggests three potential indirect
casual pathways through which one construct may be inﬂuencing
another. Firstly, inﬂated responsibility (x) may have an indirect
causal effect on negative mood (y) through IU (m). Secondly,
IU (x) may have an indirect causal effect on inﬂated respon-
sibility (y) through negative mood (m). Finally, negative mood
(x) may have an indirect causal effect on IU (y) through inﬂated
responsibility (m).
The indirect effect of inﬂated responsibility on negative mood
through IU was signiﬁcant (z = 0.08, p < 0.05) suggesting
inﬂated responsibility has both a signiﬁcant direct and indirect
effect on negative mood. The indirect pathway connecting IU to
inﬂated responsibility through negative mood was also signiﬁ-
cant (z = 0.11, p < 0.05) suggesting that while IU may not have a
signiﬁcant direct casual effect on inﬂated responsibility (see Exper-
iment 3), IU has a signiﬁcant indirect causal inﬂuence on inﬂated
responsibility through its causal effect on negative mood. Finally,
the indirect pathway connecting negative mood to IU through
inﬂated responsibility was signiﬁcant (z = 0.17, p < 0.05) sug-
gesting that while negative mood may not have a signiﬁcant direct
casual effect on IU (see Experiment 1), negative mood has a sig-
niﬁcant indirect causal inﬂuence on IU through its causal effect
on inﬂated responsibility. In summary, the direct causal relation-
ship between inﬂated responsibility and negative mood remained
signiﬁcant even after the mediating effect of IU was taken into
account. In addition to the signiﬁcant direct causal pathways con-
necting negative mood, inﬂated responsibility and IU depicted
in Figure 1, three signiﬁcant indirect causal pathways also con-
nect the constructs: ﬁrstly, inﬂated responsibility has a signiﬁcant
indirect effect on negative mood through IU, secondly, IU has a
signiﬁcant indirect effect on inﬂated responsibility through neg-
ative mood and, ﬁnally, negative mood has a signiﬁcant indirect
effect on IU through inﬂated responsibility.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this series of experiments was to demonstrate
the integrated systems-like nature of the constructs and affective
experience postulated to underlie some common forms of clin-
ical anxiety. In three experiments we manipulated two clinical
constructs (inﬂated responsibility and IU) and one affective state
(negative mood) to determine the direct effect of these manipula-
tions on each of the other measures. Finally, the causal pathways
between these variables were conﬁrmed using mediational anal-
yses and tests of indirect effects were conducted, and the causal
model to emerge from these processes is shown in Figure 1.
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Not shown in Figure 1 is the indirect effect of inﬂated respon-
sibility on negative mood through IU; the indirect effect of IU
on inﬂated responsibility through negative mood and, ﬁnally,
the indirect effect of negative mood on IU through inﬂated
responsibility.
The model presented in Figure 1, when indirect effects are
taken into consideration, supports a view of the constructs used
to explain clinical anxiety as representing elements of an inte-
grated system underlying anxious responding. Higher scores on
both clinical constructs give rise to increased negative mood, as
would be predicted or at least implied in most accounts adopting
these factors as explanatory constructs (e.g., Dugas et al., 1998;
Salkovskis and Freeston, 2001). Higher scores on negative mood
also facilitates – either directly or indirectly – measures of both
clinical constructs, and as a consequence will prime the cogni-
tive processes inherent in these constructs (e.g., assessing one’s
ability to bring about or prevent negative outcomes, appraising
uncertainty as dangerous or intolerable). The ﬁndings presented
in this paper are consistent with clinically relevant emotions such
as anxiety being considered as part of an evolved integrated threat
management system that alerts the individual to threats to goals
or challenges, and coordinates cognitive, behavioral, and affec-
tive reactions to enable the individual to respond more effectively
to these threats and challenges. Rather than one set of factors
(e.g., constructs) being causes of a different set of factors (e.g.,
affect), they are all integrated components of an anxiety precau-
tionary system that promotes a “cascade” of relevant perceptions,
cognitions, behaviors, and affective experience conducive to solv-
ing the adaptive problem (Kenrick et al., 2010). The ﬁndings
are also consistent with recent experiments demonstrating how
anxiety-related clinical symptoms (e.g., OCD relevant aversive
intrusive thoughts) facilitate anxiety-relevant appraisal processes
such as IU and responsibility – indicating a bidirectional relation-
ship between actual anxiety symptoms and OCD-relevant clinical
constructs and appraisal processes (Davey et al., 2013).
The integrated, systems-like nature of the model derived from
these ﬁndings is also consistent with contemporary transdiagnos-
tic views of clinical constructs, which argue that the phenomena
measured by clinical constructs have evolutionary origins based
on the identiﬁcation and amelioration of threats (e.g., Carleton,
2012). For example, uncertainty is more than just a trigger for
anxiety, it is itself considered threatening (Epstein, 1972), can
facilitate the perception of threat (Dugas et al., 2005a) and acti-
vate biologically relevant responses to threat such as the startle
response (Nelson and Shankman, 2011). These ﬁndings suggest
that clinically relevant constructs have effects beyond clinical
symptoms, and also inﬂuence cognitive, perceptual, and biological
responses in a way that would be predicted by an evolutionarily
conceptualized motivational systems approach. In the case of
IU, the ability to tolerate uncertainty is a common dispositional
characteristic with dimensional characteristics across both non-
clinical and clinical populations (Norton, 2005; Carleton et al.,
2012b), suggesting that it is an evolved characteristic that differs
in intensity across individuals and becomes most predominant
in clinical populations exhibiting disorders of either anxiety or
mood. Our ﬁndings also have implications for models of anxi-
ety that use constructs such as inﬂated responsibility and IU as a
central explanatory construct. For example, while the ﬁnding that
inﬂated responsibility directly effects negative mood is consistent
with the predictions of cognitivemodels of OCD that have inﬂated
responsibility as a central causal construct (e.g., Rachman, 1997;
Salkovskis and Freeston, 2001) the ﬁnding that negative mood
commonly experienced by OCD sufferers may be a direct causal
factor in elevating inﬂated responsibility beliefs suggests that neg-
ative mood is not simply a consequence of cognitions associated
with inﬂated responsibility as has been implied by these models.
Models which adopt inﬂated responsibility as a central explana-
tory construct need to account for the bidirectional nature of this
construct’s relationship with negative mood.
The integrated nature of the relationships between inﬂated
responsibility, IU and negative mood might be expected if these
clinical constructs encompass adaptive elements that help the indi-
vidual to identify and manage threats, and these processes are
activated by anxiety-generating events. Having been developed in
many cases from clinical experience to help understand clinical
disorders, however, clinical constructs may often confuse in their
deﬁnitions a range of cognitive processes that span both adap-
tive threat management processes and less adaptive responses to
threat that generate anxiety and negative affect and are directly
symptom relevant. For example, inﬂated responsibility encom-
passes the adaptive belief that one has the power to prevent harm,
but even low risk threats are then seen as essential to prevent
and are anxiety generating (Salkovskis, 1985). IU embraces the
adaptive desire for predictability but the less adaptive “paraly-
sis of cognition and action” in the face of uncertainty (Birrell
et al., 2011). While clinical constructs may encompass cognitive
and behavioral processes that contribute adaptively to dealing
with threat, by their very nature they may also encompass those
processes that give rise to exaggerated affective reactions causing
distress. Some recent attempts have been made to break down
these constructs into their derivative elements, and this will cer-
tainly help us to understand where threat management processes
end and symptoms begin (Berle and Starcevic, 2005; Coles and
Schoﬁeld, 2008; Birrell et al., 2011). In particular, viewing clin-
ical anxiety as developing out of an adaptive, evolved system
shouldmotivate researchers to distinguish between those elements
of their clinical constructs that are adaptive and those that con-
versely generate symptoms and distress that are typical of clinical
disorders.
Three issues related to the nature of the samples used in the
experiments reported within this paper are worth comment-
ing upon. Firstly, given analog samples were used in all three
experiments, it is not clear how generalizable the conclusions of
this paper are to clinical populations. Measures of pre-existing
clinical symptoms, IU, inﬂated responsibility and negative mood
were not taken. However, the series of experiments reported in
this paper were intended to create a model of the interactions
between negative mood, inﬂated responsibility, and IU within
analog samples for potential later extrapolation to clinical sam-
ples (Vervliet and Raes, 2013). Further, taxometric studies have
suggested that both GAD (Haslam, 2003) and OCD symptoms
(Haslam et al., 2005; Olatunji et al., 2008) are generally best con-
sidered as dimensional rather than categorical, supporting the
appropriateness of studying GAD and OCD related phenomena
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in analog samples. A second issue with the samples used in the
experiments reported is that, whilst males were eligible to par-
ticipate in all three experiments, the samples obtained for each
experiment consisted primarily of females. This raises questions
about the generalizability of the results presented to male popula-
tions and future research may wish to examine if a similar pattern
of results would emerge using predominantly, or exclusively,
male samples. A ﬁnal issue with the samples used in the exper-
iments reported is that the samples consisted almost exclusively
of psychology students. This raises questions about the gener-
alizability of the results presented to a wider sociodemographic
population and the validity of the results would be strength-
ened if they were replicated within a wider sociodemographic
sample.
There are several further limitations with the studies reported
within this paper which should be noted. Firstly, across all three
experiments, measures of inﬂated responsibility, IU and negative
mood were taken only after the relevant manipulation and not
pre-manipulation to ensure that participants were not alerted to
the signiﬁcance of these factors and the purpose of the experi-
ment prior to the manipulation. The studies therefore lacked the
capacity to show an increase or decrease in scores on the relevant
measures post-manipulation compared to baseline levels. In all
the experiments reported, however, a random sampling assign-
ment process was used that permits the assumption of equality
across experimental groups and allows post-manipulation infer-
ence of effects of the experimental manipulation on subsequent
post-manipulationmeasures (Campbell, 1957). Themeasurement
approach adopted in this paper has also been used in similar
studies in which inﬂated responsibility (Ladouceur et al., 1995;
Bouchard et al., 1999; Arntz et al., 2007) and mood (Scott and
Cervone, 2002) have been manipulated. A second limitation with
the experiments reported is that measures of psychological con-
structs which potentiallymay have affected participants’ responses
to the relevant experimental manipulations were not included
(e.g., measures of empathy, which may have affected participants’
responses to the vignettes used in Experiments 2 and 3). How-
ever, one would hope that the randomization process used in each
experiment would result in an equal distribution of participants
scoring relatively high or low in terms of these psychological con-
structs (e.g., empathy) between the relevant experimental groups
(Campbell, 1957). Within the series of experiments reported par-
ticipants taking part in Experiment 1 were not excluded from
taking part in Experiment 2, and participants taking part in Exper-
iments 1 and 2 were not excluded from taking part in Experiment
3. It is therefore possible some of the participants taking part in
Experiments 2 and 3 may have taken part in a previous exper-
iment and have been somewhat familiar with the experimental
procedure and the measures used. Finally, the number of clini-
cal constructs manipulated and measured in the studies reported
in this paper was necessarily limited in terms of number. An inte-
grated threatmanagement system as described in this paper would
predict that other clinical constructs notmanipulated ormeasured
in any of the experiments reported in this paper should also have
integrated relationships with other clinical constructs and nega-
tive affect as described. Future research may wish to address this
possibility.
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